社会情感选择理论
股东
业务
透视图(图形)
公司治理
会计
财务
心理学
发展心理学
人工智能
计算机科学
作者
Andrea Calabrò,Mariateresa Torchia,Fabio Quarato,Alfredo Valentino,Domenico Rocco Cambrea,Fynn‐Willem Lohe
标识
DOI:10.1177/08944865231205847
摘要
From a mixed gamble perspective, we contend that family firms (FFs) with different family shareholder structures are confronted with different trade-offs among current and prospective financial and socioemotional wealth (SEW), leading to differences in their international acquisition choices. We also explore the moderating role of family leadership and performance aspirations. Our findings show that FFs with a dominant family owner are more likely to pursue international acquisitions, especially when FFs are led by a family CEO or when they experience below-target performance, as in such cases, they prioritize prospective financial and SEW gains, thereby sacrificing current SEW and financial wealth.
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