违反直觉
斯塔克伯格竞赛
业务
产品(数学)
佣金
产业组织
模式(计算机接口)
营销
微观经济学
商业
经济
计算机科学
财务
认识论
哲学
操作系统
数学
几何学
作者
Xin Wang,Yu Lin,Shuhua Zhang,Shuping Wu,Baoqin Yu,Xiaofen Ye
摘要
Abstract This study considers a market comprising two suppliers and one e‐commerce platform. The two competitive suppliers sell products to consumers through the platform. The platform can choose three selling modes: reseller, market, and mixed. Additionally, we consider two referral strategies—namely, exclusive and nonexclusive recommendations—and build a three‐party Stackelberg game model. Per the findings, the difference in the players' decision‐making results exhibits an essential relationship with the recommendation market's initial size. A counterintuitive result is that the product price is not affected by the commission rate in the market mode. This provides referential insights for platforms and suppliers.
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