顺从(心理学)
忧虑
执行
审计
基于Agent的模型
微观经济学
点(几何)
忠诚
经济
社会影响力
计算机科学
公共经济学
业务
心理学
人工智能
会计
认知心理学
社会心理学
几何学
法学
电信
数学
政治学
作者
Adam K. Korobow,Chris Plauché Johnson,Robert L. Axtell
出处
期刊:National Tax Journal
[The University of Chicago Press]
日期:2007-09-01
卷期号:60 (3): 589-610
被引量:68
标识
DOI:10.17310/ntj.2007.3.16
摘要
In this paper, we use a computational modeling approach to examine the long-standing social issue of tax compliance. Specifically, we design an agent-based model—the Networked Agent-Based Compliance Model (NACSM)—where taxpayers not only exist within localized social networks, but also possess heterogeneous characteristics such as perceptions about the likelihood of audit and apprehension. When making compliance decisions, agents in our model factor in their neighbors' compliance strategy payoffs. We find that for a given enforcement regime, a world with limited knowledge of neighbor payoffs appears to lead to higher levels of aggregate compliance than when agents are aware of neighbor strategy payoffs and factor these into their individual compliance decisions. As this paper demonstrates the strength and initial results of our approach, we point to the need for further research using the NACSM approach and similar models as well as the development of higher fidelity agent-based compliance models.
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