The fragility of experts: A moderated-mediation model of expertise, identity threat, & overprecision

Experts play a crucial role in modern organizations, but evidence regarding the soundness and reliability of their decision-making is mixed and often contradictory. Drawing on theories of identity threat, I argue that experts are more susceptible to bias following disconfirming feedback from others. A series of lab experiments show that (a) experts are more likely than novices to double-down and produce overly precise predictions following disconfirming feedback; (b) this feedback-induced overprecision by experts is mediated by perceived level of expert identity threat; and (c) self-affirmation attenuates identity threat and reduces overprecision. I supplement these experimental findings by investigating experts’ response to disconfirming feedback in a real-world settings - Major League Baseball umpiring. Ultimately, I propose a moderated-mediation model of expert decision-making to understand “when” and “why” experts offer overly precise judgments that is unavoidable and prevalent in organizational settings.