企业社会责任
授权
业务
中国
债务
会计
债务融资
自然实验
财务
公共关系
政治学
数学
统计
法学
作者
Huifeng Xu,Xiaodong Xu,Junli Yu
标识
DOI:10.1080/1540496x.2019.1657401
摘要
This paper studies the impact of mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures on cost of debt financing (COD) in China, using a quasi-natural experiment that mandates a subset of listed firms to issue CSR reports. We find that these firms exhibit cheaper debt financing after they are subject to this mandate and easier access to long-term bank loans, and the decrease in the COD is more pronounced among firms with longer CSR reports and higher CSR scores and that follow Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines. In addition, we introduce regulatory theory to verify firms that are politically connected enjoy a greater reduction in the COD after the mandate than those that are not politically connected. Our results have important implications for our understanding of the economic consequences of mandatory CSR disclosures from the perspective of the debt market.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI