An Accessional Signature Scheme With Unmalleable Transaction Implementation to Securely Redeem Cryptocurrencies

The surging interest in cryptocurrency has revitalized the research for digital signature schemes with strong security. In particular, signature schemes are investigated to resist the malleability attacks in cryptocurrency platforms. However, existing signature schemes only conquer partial malleability attacks due to various sources of attacks. Other solutions of new transaction realizations cannot simultaneously avoid the malleability attacks on both standard and contract transactions. Furthermore, the malleability attack becomes more stubborn in fast clearing applications. In this paper, we propose SigNT, an accessional signature scheme with unmalleable transaction implementations. The key of SigNT is an improved interactive signature scheme for securely instant confirmation of transactions. Unlike standard signatures, this signature is generated by the owner and block producers. Combining it with several other optimizations ( i.e ., hash execution of intermediate transactions and secret-based claiming conditions), SigNT achieves complete resistance against malleability attacks in both the standard and contract transactions. As an example, we show an implementation in Bitcoin with the “providing a deposit” protocol. The security analysis and comparative experiments demonstrate that SigNT has the best resistance against malleability attacks than previous malleability solutions. Besides, better performance is achieved than other schemes.