块链
供应链
还原(数学)
碳纤维
环境科学
业务
计算机科学
计算机安全
数学
几何学
算法
营销
复合数
作者
Feng Wang,lingrong zhang
摘要
The difficulty of regulating carbon trading due to information asymmetry and low consumer trust in low-carbon products are key factors hindering companies from reducing emissions. This paper examines a manufacturer-led secondary low-carbon supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a retailer, focusing on the impact of blockchain technology on carbon transaction costs and consumers' low-carbon preferences. Utilizing Stackelberg game theory, the paper constructs a supply chain decision model for emission reduction, determining the payment matrix and analyzing the stable strategy for blockchain adoption through evolutionary game theory. The findings indicate that retailers' adoption of blockchain technology significantly promotes emission reduction within the supply chain, whereas manufacturers' adoption has minimal impact. Additionally, the study reveals that variations in blockchain adoption costs and carbon quotas result in multiple evolutionary stable strategies. Specifically, when blockchain adoption costs and carbon quotas are below certain thresholds, the system reaches a unique equilibrium where both parties adopt blockchain technology.
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