移动应用程序
钥匙(锁)
保护
隐私政策
竞赛(生物学)
互联网隐私
应用商店
业务
佣金
信息隐私
移动设备
消费者隐私
计算机科学
广告
跟踪(教育)
定向广告
计算机安全
竞争政策
政府(语言学)
1998年数据保护法
消费者保护
移动宽带
数字经济
智能手机应用程序
最佳实践
设计隐私
在线广告
FTC公平信息实践
大数据
移动电话技术
营销
公共政策
政策分析
电子商务
作者
Yi Gao,Meilin Gu,Dengpan Liu
标识
DOI:10.25300/misq/2024/17880
摘要
Recently, a controversial new privacy policy on mobile app platforms, which requires app developers to display privacy labels and explicitly request data-tracking permissions from users, has sparked a heated discussion among practitioners in digital advertising. In this paper, we build a game-theoretic model to examine how this new policy impacts the key stakeholders of a mobile app platform (i.e., app developers, the platform, and consumers). The model captures how the new policy prompts developers to expand their strategies beyond pricing by introducing data-tracking levels as an additional competitive dimension, which in turn affects the intensity of price competition. We find that while implementing a policy restricting developers’ tracking of consumers may increase the platform’s advertising revenue, it can also put the platform at a disadvantage. This is because it may incentivize developers to lower their prices and engage in more intense price competition, consequently reducing the platform’s commission revenue. Regarding app developers, the new policy may prove beneficial despite its restriction to tracking only consumers who have opted in. Another noteworthy finding is that while platforms have asserted that the new policy is aimed at safeguarding consumers’ privacy, it does not always serve consumers’ best interests. Our paper provides meaningful implications for all key stakeholders of mobile app platforms regarding the implementation of the new privacy policy.
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