斯塔克伯格竞赛
供应链
利润(经济学)
业务
关税
在线和离线
微观经济学
渠道协调
对偶(语法数字)
反向感应
频道(广播)
产业组织
服务(商务)
博弈论
服务质量
供应链管理
营销
经济
计算机科学
电信
艺术
国际贸易
文学类
操作系统
作者
Shulin Gu,Yong Liu,Gang Zhao
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jretconser.2023.103483
摘要
With the rapid development of e-commerce, the problem of pricing conflicts between online and offline channels has become increasingly prominent. And the in-sale service has become an important factor influencing consumers' purchase decisions. To study the impact of in-sale service, this paper establishes a dual-channel supply chain model considering offline in-sale service. Using Stackelberg's game theory and backward induction, it solves the optimal pricing of supply chain members and makes comparisons in both cooperative and non-cooperative situations. Finally, it coordinates the supply chain through a two-part tariff contract. The results show that (1) The optimal wholesale price and offline retail price are positively correlated with in-sale service quality. And the opposite of the optimal online direct selling price. (2) With the quality of in-sale service improving, the retailer's profit will increase and then decrease but the manufacturer's profit will always decrease under non-cooperation. The total profit of the supply chain will rise and then fall under cooperation. (3) The two-part tariff coordination maximizes profits with the manufacturer reducing the wholesale price and the retailer paying a transfer cost. (4) Cooperative decision is better than the non-cooperative decision in terms of the supply chain as a whole.
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