官僚主义
实证研究
公共政策
公共行政
政策制定
经验证据
公共关系
政治学
公共经济学
经济
业务
政治
法学
认识论
哲学
作者
Hang Duong,Joshua McDonnell,Jeannette Taylor
标识
DOI:10.1504/ijpp.2022.127430
摘要
Performance management (PM) systems are now widely used by governments to hold public organisations to account for the delivery of public policies. Yet, numerous empirical studies have reported that these systems have encouraged bureaucrats to manipulate their behaviour and engage in gaming of performance measures and targets. This article on bureaucratic gaming of performance measures and targets addresses three questions. First, what is bureaucratic gaming? Second, what are the primary causes of bureaucratic gaming? Third, what are the main consequences of bureaucratic gaming for policy-making? A review of empirical studies on bureaucratic gaming points to issues relating to policy performance, the well-being of policy-takers, and policy actors' trust in PM.
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