Equity Incentive,Agency Costs and Corporate Performance——Based on the Analysis Framework of Double Principal-agent Problem

Based on the problem of double principal-agent,this paper constructs the mediating effect model of incentive,agency cost and corporate performance,puts the three into a uniform analysis framework and empirically tests the effects of equity incentive on corporate performance and agency cost and the mediating roles played by agency cost in equity incentive and corporate performance relationship by using the panel data of Chinese listed companies of A share from 2006 to 2013. Research finds: equity incentive can significantly raise corporate performance and efficiently inhibit the first type of agency cost but its harnessing effects on the second agency problem are not significant; The first agency cost plays partial mediating roles between equity incentive and corporate performance,that is,equity incentive indirectly generates promoting effects on corporate performance by the role route of the first type of agency cost but the mediating roles of the second agency cost are not significant.