Game theoretic analysis of logistics service coordination in a live-streaming e-commerce system

This study explores the coordination issues in the logistics service supply chain, which stem from the rapid development of live-streaming e-commerce (LSE). It also investigates the influences of a cost-sharing mechanism on the key decisions for live-streaming e-commerce logistics service supply chains (LSE-LSSC) with regard to the level of effort of logistics services. The motivation of the research is derived from the growing efficiency demands for logistics services in the LSE field. We consider an LSE-LSSC, which consists of one e-commerce shipper, one logistics service integrator, and one logistics service provider. On the basis of the game theoretic method, the performance of the logistics service supply chain is assessed and compared with four models among the participating entities of the LSE-LSSC. Some interesting results and key managerial insights are obtained in the modeling study. More importantly, the influences of cost-sharing on the key decisions of each player are discussed in detail, and the coordination contract of the level of effort of the logistics service is estimated.