Deterrence at sea: the Maritime domain in US Deterrence strategy in the Indo-Pacific

US strategy toward the Indo-Pacific sets two broad deterrence goals: deter adversaries from altering the rules-based order in the region's maritime domain and deter adversaries from altering existing territorial boundaries. Deterring threats from the maritime domain is critical to achieving both goals. The primary challenger to the USA in the region, China, would have to project power through the maritime domain to take such provocative actions as conducting an amphibious invasion of Taiwan or disrupting freedom of the seas in the South China Sea. This article explores the history of US operationalization of deterrence against maritime threats in the Indo-Pacific and analyzes the efficacy of different deterrence measures against such threats. It uses case studies of the three Taiwan Strait crises, US Continuous Bomber Presence, and US Freedom of Navigation Operations to examine these questions. It finds that the USA has historically employed a mix of deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial with military and nonmilitary tools, and it argues that this mix of denial and punishment has effectively deterred escalation that would threaten existing territorial boundaries or alteration of the existing maritime order. This provides some empirical evidence and arguments for continuing an integrated deterrence-like strategy.