Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) play a critical role in the formulation and application of global technical standards, while the FRAND (Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory) principle serves as an essential mechanism to regulate SEP licensing practices and balance the interests of patent holders and implementers. However, the implementation of the FRAND principle in practice faces significant challenges. On the one hand, the "reasonableness" of licensing rates lacks a unified standard, leading to frequent disputes and litigation; on the other hand, transnational judicial conflicts, coupled with the interplay of injunctions and anti-suit injunctions, significantly increase compliance and operational risks for global enterprises. As a key participant in international standardization, China is both a major user of SEPs and an emerging exporter of patents, gradually developing unique approaches through judicial decisions, policy frameworks, and enterprise practices. Based on an analysis of the theoretical foundations and international practices of the FRAND principle, this paper examines the difficulties encountered in its implementation and reflects on China's responses through representative cases and institutional measures. Furthermore, it proposes optimization strategies for China's path, including improving rate determination mechanisms, balancing innovation incentives and market competition, and establishing diversified dispute resolution mechanisms, with the aim of providing references for China's institutional development and corporate strategies in global standard competition.