股息
业务
投资(军事)
股利政策
货币经济学
代理(哲学)
企业集团
现金流
政府(语言学)
自由现金流
财务
经济
公司治理
认识论
法学
哲学
政治
语言学
政治学
作者
Dongmin Kong,Mianmian Ji,Lihua Liu
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.pacfin.2022.101910
摘要
This research explores capital allocation efficiency in business groups when parent firms experience adverse shocks in their cash flow. Using the quasi-experimental method, this study finds that: (1) When parent central state-owned enterprises (parent CSOEs) are required to pay dividends to the government, their group-affiliated listed central state-owned enterprises (listed CSOEs) substantially improve investment efficiency. (2) A plausible mechanism is that the adverse cash shocks of parent CSOEs could facilitate the resource reallocation through related party transactions within a business group motivated by the listed CSOEs' investment opportunity instead of the parent CSOEs' tunneling behavior. (3) Our findings are more pronounced for firms with more serious agency problems. Overall, we provide the empirical evaluation of the economic consequences of mandatory dividend policy in terms of a firm's investment efficiency within a state-owned business group.
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