回归不连续设计
执行
权力下放
中国
自然实验
业务
环境法规
波特假说
自然资源
经济
环境经济学
自然资源经济学
生态学
政治学
市场经济
病理
统计
生物
医学
法学
数学
作者
Bing Zhang,Xiaolan Chen,Huanxiu Guo
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.05.009
摘要
This paper draws on a natural experiment generated by the National Specially Monitored Firms (NSMF) program in China to evaluate the effectiveness of central supervision at improving local environmental enforcement. We explore a unique firm-level Chinese Environmental Statistics dataset and utilize a regression discontinuity design to assess the impact of central supervision through the NSMF program on an industrial firm's chemical oxygen demand (COD) emissions. The results suggest that central supervision significantly reduces industrial COD emissions by at least 26.8%. These results highlight the substantial room for improvement in Chinese environmental regulations via central supervision. A more flexible environmental decentralization regime and comprehensive central supervision are thus recommended for future reforms.
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