业务
服务提供商
收入
补贴
福利
营销
收益管理
结果(博弈论)
社会福利
服务(商务)
净损失
产业组织
经济
消费者福利
客户关系管理
经济盈余
顾客满意度
价格歧视
客户保留
微观经济学
客户群
互联网
公共经济学
经济福利
定价策略
激励
市场份额
客户服务
捆绑
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2026-10-05
被引量:1
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2024.07399
摘要
Digital platforms that connect customers with service providers often monetize by selling customer leads to interested providers. Examples include Bark, Google Local Services, HomeAdvisor, Modernize, Porch, and Thumbtack. This paper develops a game-theoretic model to analyze how lead pricing affects customer and provider welfare. When the platform raises the fee-per-lead for a customer-type, those customers—conditional on receiving the same number of provider quotes—are quoted lower prices. However, if the fee is sufficiently high, providers purchase fewer of these leads, which can reduce the number of quotes and diminish customer surplus. To maximize social welfare, a simple policy that sets a market-clearing fee-per-lead for each customer-type guarantees at least [Formula: see text] of the first-best welfare and at least [Formula: see text] of the welfare under the welfare-optimal fees. The first-best outcome can be achieved by subsidizing providers for each job well done, so that experienced providers with cheaper sources of leads do not exit the platform. Understanding these welfare trade-offs can help platforms design policies that support balanced marketplace growth and preserve a sustainable revenue stream. This paper was accepted by Srikanth Jagabathula, market design, platform, and demand analytics. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07399 .
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