意识形态
政治
政治经济学
利益相关者
业务
利益相关者理论
经济
政治学
公共关系
干系人管理
法律与经济学
社会学
执行
公司治理
舆论
探索者
企业社会责任
公共行政
社会心理学
工作(物理)
市场经济
保守主义
实证经济学
作者
K. C. Nair,Marlon Mooijman
标识
DOI:10.5465/amj.2023.0510
摘要
CEO activism refers to public stance-taking by CEOs on politically polarized issues. The prevailing view is that liberal and conservative stakeholders respond symmetrically to CEO activism, like how liberal and conservative voters have been found to respond to ideological causes. Specifically, both groups are thought to similarly favor ideologically aligned CEO activism, and disfavor ideologically misaligned CEO activism and non-activism. We question the assumption that liberal–conservative symmetry in national politics translates to stakeholder preferences. Extending research indicating that liberals scrutinize the perceived benefits and costs that businesses impose on society more than conservatives due to differences in purpose of business beliefs, we theorize that liberal stakeholders respond more favorably to aligned activism, and less favorably to misaligned activism and non-activism. We corroborate our ideological asymmetry model in three preregistered experiments examining job seekers and consumers. Crucially, conservatives, unlike liberals, prefer non-activism over aligned activism, even when conservatives feel strongly about the underlying issue. Experimentally reducing the liberal–conservative gap on purpose of business beliefs reduces these asymmetries. Our work challenges the assumption that liberal–conservative symmetry in politics translates to business; sheds new light on the strategic implications of CEO activism; and may explain the rarity of conservative CEO activism.
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