激励
供应链
质量(理念)
业务
供应链风险管理
产业组织
供应链管理
过程管理
经济
微观经济学
服务管理
营销
认识论
哲学
作者
Seung Ho Yoo,Taesu Cheong
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.tre.2018.01.005
摘要
Abstract This paper investigates several incentive mechanisms for collaborative product quality improvement in a buyer-driven supply chain, and the impacts of those mechanisms on supply chain performance. The buyer, the Stackelberg leader, determines the sales price of a product while the supplier is responsible for production and product quality determination. We develop analytical models incorporating two reward schemes to better understand how the buyer can facilitate the supplier’s quality improvement efforts. We offer managerial insights and practical guidelines for implementing quality management in the supply chain, derived from both an analytical comparison and numerical experiments.
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