裁决
公司治理
功能(生物学)
法律与经济学
工作(物理)
司法意见
政治学
司法能动主义
法学
集合(抽象数据类型)
司法审查
司法自由裁量权
维数(图论)
控制(管理)
社会学
调解
社会功能
司法独立
资本主义
社会控制
订单(交换)
多样性(政治)
经济
摘要
ABSTRACT Courts have long been recognized as venues of social control and policymaking. The rise of regulatory capitalism suggests reconsidering the judiciary in regulatory terms, notably through work that casts courts as regulators. This article argues, however, that styling courts as regulators is both analytically and normatively deficient: it obscures the distinctive function of courts and their contribution to social ordering. At the same time, judicial decision‐making plainly exhibits a regulatory dimension. Yet rather than stretching the concept of regulation, this article proposes to capture this dimension through governance theory. On this theoretical foundation, the article outlines a model of judicial governance that elucidates how social ordering emerges from adjudication and how it unfolds over time. In particular, the model highlights the implications of judicial decision‐making for private ordering and draws attention to processes of intermediation through lawyers, media, and advanced digital technologies. It thus opens a set of analytically structured research questions and complements them with a methodological framework to orient future work on judicial governance.
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