文件夹
四分之一(加拿大硬币)
目标日期基金
共同基金
明星(博弈论)
业务
封闭式基金
财务
开放式基金
基金基金
收益基金
佣金
基金管理
经济
货币经济学
机构投资者
公司治理
地理
数学分析
考古
市场流动性
数学
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103839
摘要
This paper investigates portfolio pumping at the fund family level, where non-star fund managers strategically purchase stocks held by star funds in the family to inflate their quarter-end performance. Star funds that engage in such activities show inflated performance after 2002 when the Securities and Exchange Commission increased regulation on portfolio pumping. Stocks pumped by the strategy show strong reversals at the quarter end. Moreover, despite a minor underperformance stemming from portfolio misallocation, non-star fund managers pumping for star funds receive abnormally high subsequent flows, suggesting a pattern of family subsidization.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI