How can the recycling of power batteries for EVs be promoted in China? A multiparty cooperative game analysis

While electric vehicles (EVs) are developing at a high speed in China, the power battery market is facing a decommissioning peak. The problem is that the recycling situation of domestic power batteries is not ideal, partly due to neglect by consumers. By considering the recycling system, mode, and policy of China's EV power batteries, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, consumers and EV manufacturers; analyse the stable strategy adjustment mechanisms of tripartite participation in this recycling cooperation game; and simulate the tripartite evolutionary game. The results show that when the initial willingness of the government, consumers and EV manufacturers to recycle power batteries is not strong, the government takes the lead, driving EV manufacturers and consumers to participate in power battery recycling. When the government, consumers and EV manufacturers have medium or high levels of initial willingness, the government evolves and chooses a nonregulation strategy. In addition, by simulating the impact of changes in consumer-related influencing factors on this tripartite evolutionary game, we find that subsidies for recycling power batteries are a key factor affecting consumers' strategy choices and that boosting recycling compensation for consumers can improve their enthusiasm to participate in such recycling. Therefore, to improve the recycling of power batteries for EVs, in terms of both efficiency and percentage of deployment, the Chinese government should strengthen public education on power battery recycling, further integrate informal recycling channels, and balance the distribution of profits among consumers for recycling compensation.