计算机科学
激励
拥挤感测
声誉
收入
可靠性
集合(抽象数据类型)
干扰(通信)
算法
计算机安全
计算机网络
法学
社会科学
频道(广播)
政治学
微观经济学
程序设计语言
社会学
会计
业务
经济
作者
Yuanlu Li,Wuqi Gao,Junming Luo
标识
DOI:10.1109/icetci55101.2022.9832273
摘要
In the application of crowdsensing technology to the perception of parking space status, a set of incentive mechanism optimization algorithms are designed to address the problem that crowdsensing systems using traditional auction incentive mechanisms are susceptible to interference from non-platform users and thus reduce credibility. First, the user's feedback information is verified to reduce the impact of interference information on the platform; second, the user's additional rewards are adjusted through the dynamically updated reputation value to encourage users to provide more high-quality perception data. The simulation results show that the optimization model has better performance than the traditional model in terms of platform revenue and the iterative evolution of the proportion of trusted users.
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