机会主义
宗派
控制(管理)
业务
意外事故
权变理论
产业组织
结果(博弈论)
管理控制系统
利用
色散(光学)
微观经济学
经济
计算机科学
计算机安全
管理
市场经济
社会学
物理
哲学
光学
语言学
人类学
作者
Yinqiu Tang,Yongqiang Chen,Hongjiang Yao,Yuting Chen
标识
DOI:10.1080/09537287.2023.2166882
摘要
The subcontracting organizational arrangement has received limited attention in designing the control mechanism. This study has explored how managerial controls affect opportunistic behaviour and developed a contingency framework to investigate the moderating effect of subcontracting dispersion. By using survey data from 323 general contractors in the Chinese construction industry, this study reveals that both outcome control and clan control curb the occurrence of subcontractors' opportunistic behaviours while behaviour control scarcely helps. Besides, subcontractor dispersion distinctively moderates these relationships. A high level of subcontractor dispersion amplifies the opportunism-curbing effect of outcome control, but attenuates that of clan control, which leads to more opportunistic behaviours. Only at a lower level of subcontractor dispersion will behaviour control mitigate subcontractors' opportunistic behaviours. Our configurational analyses reveal the substitute and complementary relationship between different control modes with different levels of subcontracting dispersion. This study contributes to the literature on governing opportunism and managerial control. The findings guide managers of the general contractor to exploit appropriate managerial controls to curb opportunistic behaviours across different organizational designs.
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