利润(经济学)
供应链
残余物
纳什均衡
业务
闭环
产业组织
博弈论
稳健性(进化)
微观经济学
计算机科学
经济
营销
控制工程
工程类
生物化学
化学
算法
基因
作者
Yanhong Yuan,Jinyao Yang,Li Yang,Wei Li
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.techfore.2019.119823
摘要
In order to eliminate profit loss caused by decentralized decision-making in closed-loop supply chain systems, this paper adopts the method of optimization analysis and game theory to analyze the necessary conditions for manufacturers, retailers and third-party online recyclers to achieve interest coordination under equilibrium conditions. In addition, the robustness of the results is verified by numerical analysis. The results show that in order to make the total profit of decentralized decision-making equivalent to that of centralized decision-making, the recycling cost of retailers and third-party recyclers must be the same; new products must be shipped at zero profit, re-manufactured products shall be sold at the difference between the residual value of the recovered product and the cost of recovery, and the manufacturer's recycling price shall be determined by the cost of recycling and residual value. It implies that multi-channel recycling must be carried out under the premise of uniform recycling costs. At the same time as the elimination of the product price increase, the manufacturer's income must be guaranteed through agreements and other forms. The government can realize the recovery price in the direction of benefiting consumers by improving the residual value of used products and easing channel competition.
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