心理学
归属
唤醒
客观主义
认知
认知心理学
情绪双因素理论
感觉
心理理论
感知
社会心理学
情感科学
认识论
情感工作
哲学
神经科学
出处
期刊:Emotion Review
[SAGE Publishing]
日期:2016-11-11
卷期号:9 (1): 17-26
被引量:29
标识
DOI:10.1177/1754073916639665
摘要
Three main versions of cognition-arousal theory are distinguished depending on how they interpret the theory’s basic postulate, that an emotion is a function of cognition and arousal: objectivist causal theories, attributional theories, and fusion theories. The objectivist causal and attributional theories each comprise a causal-functional and a part-whole version, and the fusion theory subsumes in particular a categorization and a perceptual integration version. In addition, the attributional version of cognition-arousal theory can be reinterpreted as a theory of emotion self-ascription. Although arousal may in fact not be necessary for emotions, a modified cognition-feeling theory that replaces arousal with intrinsically affective feelings, seems still viable. Arguments are presented why the objectivist causal-functional version of this theory should be preferred.
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