Research on collaborative development and innovation strategies for green deliverable aviation equipment product

Purpose In this paper, innovative proposes the concept of integrating green delivery, incorporating post-manufacturing requirements into the development process of aviation equipment products. Design/methodology/approach Through Stackelberg game equilibrium analysis and case validation, we investigate the impact of green innovation capability elasticity on the effectiveness of cost-sharing incentives. Findings When the elasticity of green (assembly) process innovation capability is low, cost-sharing by the main manufacturer can better incentivize the green delivery process. As elasticity increases but remains within a controllable range, non-cost-sharing incentives become more effective. Originality/value By optimizing cost-sharing incentive mechanisms, main manufacturers can more effectively guide integrated suppliers to participate in green delivery, thereby reducing environmental impact and improving overall supply chain efficiency. Additionally, this research provides a reference framework for green supply chain management in other high-end equipment manufacturing industries, contributing to their sustainable development.