The politics of higher education in China: the signal–response mechanism, downward tiered pressure escalation, and the Double First-Class University Initiative

This article examines the politics of higher education in China drawing on empirical data collected from three elite universities listed in the 'Double First-Class University Initiative'. We investigate how a 'signal – response' mechanism, in which the country's top leaders signal broad policy goals and subordinate officials respond, works in China's higher education arena. To address the uncertainties caused by vague signals and avoid blame for failure to fulfil policy goals, a strategy involving a gradual downward increase of implementation pressure within the bureaucratic hierarchy, termed cengceng jiama (层层加码), has been adopted. Universities and their faculties/departments now establish their own 'up-or-leave' systems to remove underperforming researchers, apply more stringent criteria when assessing faculty members' publication rates, and discriminate against domestically trained PhDs when hiring. Consequently, faculty members, especially those in the younger generation, often experience high levels of anxiety, insecurity and inequality, which can hinder their development as scholars.