外部性
立法
利益相关者
业务
产品(数学)
生产(经济)
福利
产业组织
环境经济学
经济
微观经济学
市场经济
几何学
数学
管理
政治学
法学
作者
Atalay Atasu,Öznur Özdemir‐Akyıldırım,Luk N. Van Wassenhove
标识
DOI:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01364.x
摘要
In this study, we compare two common forms of product take‐back legislation implementation: (i) manufacturer‐operated systems, where the state imposes certain take‐back objectives on manufacturers, and (ii) state‐operated systems, where manufacturers or consumers finance take‐back through recovery fees. We show that their impacts on different stakeholders, that is, social welfare, manufacturers, consumers, and the environment, can be significantly different and stakeholder preferences for these models vary depending on the operating environments (e.g., production and take‐back costs, and environmental externalities). We also consider the impact of operational externalities such as operating and monitoring costs, and show how they affect stakeholder preferences.
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