摘要
THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD: An Evolution of Thinking from Darwin to Dewey by Henry M. Cowles. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020. 384 pages. Hardcover; $35.00. ISBN: 9780674976191. *Despite its main title, this book is not an analysis of the scientific method as such, or its use by scientists, but rather it is a socio-cultural history of that method as an idea, as the subtitle indicates. Cowles begins the book with the eye-catching claim: "The scientific method does not exist. But 'the scientific method' does." By this he means that the scientific method, as portrayed in (high school) science textbooks, does not exist as a universal method employed by scientists in their quest for new knowledge. Rather, what does exist is a history of ideas: a set of philosophical ideas that transformed into notions about the mind and cognition, which ultimately ended up as a set of steps in introductory chapters in textbooks presented as a universal method. *Cowles combines exhaustive research with interesting storytelling to weave a fascinating narrative about the history of the idea of method. The second chapter, "Hypothesis Unbound," sets the stage for his narrative: although Thomas Carlyle, Charles Babbage, and John Herschel make cameo appearances here, Cowles's main thread is the public philosophical disagreement between William Whewell and John Stuart Mill on what constituted thinking. This prepares the ground for Cowles's main thread, which begins in earnest with the third chapter, "Nature's Method." Here he suggests that Charles Darwin's goal of presenting evolution meant paying close attention to methods of thinking--and this began the story of how a philosophical idea about method evolved into taking it as a natural form of cognition. *Chapter four, "Mental Evolution," highlights Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer's thought, which takes the debates about method and evolution into the realm of social development, whereas chapter five, "A Living Science," chronicles the rise of pragmatism in the United States--with Charles Pierce and William James--and its use of method as a way to think about logic, psychology, and practical problem-solving. Chapter six, "Animal Intelligence," feels a bit like an interlude with its focus on the rise of behaviorism in psychology, featuring John Watson, Edward Thorndike, and B. F. Skinner. Cowles's history ends with two chapters entitled "Laboratory School" and "A Method Only," in which he narrates how John Dewey's book How We Think became the basis for embedding this naturalized model of thinking into textbooks as "the scientific method." The main threads of Cowles's narrative move from discussions around what sort of methodology might unite science generally to the way that psychology sought to read "method" as a way of understanding intelligence and cognition. *As a book of cultural history, The Scientific Method is a fascinating, detailed account of how "method" threaded its way through political, cultural, social, and academic discussions. Cowles's chapters are exhaustively researched, and are peppered with quotes and anecdotes. It is impressive scholarship, although perhaps dizzying at times, for it is sometimes difficult to keep track of the main theme in the myriad of detail that rushes at the reader. This also makes the book feel a bit unfocused--as a chapter develops its rich details of analysis and discovery, the main idea about accounting for "the scientific method" seems to get lost; at times, it is difficult to see the relevance of all the rich and interesting detail to the book's main point. *Further, although the book claims, in its first chapter, to show that there is no such thing as "the scientific method," it actually spends little to no time actually analyzing the legitimacy of "the method" itself or its possible use among scientists, either in the social or natural sciences. Do psychologists or sociologists use (something like) scientific methods? Do biologists, chemists, or physicists? Cowles's book says little about this. Although Cowles's introductory claim might lead a reader to think that they would find at least reference to philosophical analyses of the scientific method--such as Barry Gower's historical and philosophical book, Scientific Method (Routledge, 1997)--Cowles's book is not about the use of methods by actual scientists in the course of their research nor about a philosophical analysis of the philosophical debates and controversies around "the scientific method." This might have required substantive discussion--perhaps with their own chapters--about figures such as Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, and Isaac Newton, as well as more recent figures such as Rudolf Carnap, Karl Popper, and Hans Reichenbach; discussions around induction and truth would have figured more prominently as well. Although, at the start of the book, a reader might feel that the book is meant to be a complete history of this idea, in the end, it has a more limited claim--that is, how "the scientific method" ended up as a set of steps of inquiry in (high school) science textbooks. Cowles's book is an interesting history of this more limited claim, and those looking for a more conceptual or philosophical discussion around the merits of "the" scientific method, will have to look elsewhere. *Reviewed by Clarence W. Joldersma, Professor, Philosophy of Education, and Director, Master of Education Program, Calvin University, Grand Rapids, MI 49546.