声誉
审查
官僚主义
激励
功率(物理)
规范性
公共关系
相关性(法律)
政治学
业务
公共行政
经济
法学
政治
微观经济学
物理
量子力学
作者
Anthony Michael Bertelli,Madalina Busuioc
摘要
We explore the democratic implications of a reputational account of bureaucratic authority. While an influential literature has examined the relevance of reputation-and mutual exchange between principals and agents in public organizations generally-the normative implications of these insights have largely escaped scrutiny. We discuss how reputation-building impacts both the ability and the motivation of principals to oversee administrative policymaking. We argue that reputation-sourced authority eschews ex ante incentives through the claims-making and maneuvering of bureaucrats as they develop reputations with audiences. At the same time, it de-legitimizes ex post oversight because monitoring and compliance must compete both with reputational authority and with resistance from the audiences that are the very sources of such authority.
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