Impact of government subsidies and carbon inclusion mechanism on carbon emission reduction and consumption willingness in low-carbon supply chain

It is crucial for long-term carbon emission reduction to analyze how the government affects enterprises and customers to reduce carbon emissions and purchase low-carbon products. A tripartite evolutionary game among the government, enterprises, and customers is constructed. In addition, the evolutionary courses of the game among the behaviors of government, enterprises, and customers are examined. On this basis, the influence of internal and external factors on the results is analyzed. MATLAB software is used for numerical simulation analysis to simulate the influence of some parameters on the decision-making of game players. The analysis demonstrates that: the subsidy for enterprises has a more significant influence on the behavior of the government than on those made by enterprises and customers. At this point, enterprises and customers will take more account of the government's decision, which will lead to the strategies of "low-carbon production mode" and "purchasing low-carbon products," respectively. This paper focuses on the impacts of the low-carbon consumption subsidy policy and the "carbon inclusion" system on the evolution of the three parties. When carbon credits are at a reasonable level and low-carbon consumption subsidies are combined with carbon inclusion mechanism, it may be observed that the former is more effective in encouraging customers to purchase low-carbon products. In other words, this is the situation where the two policy implementations are most effective. Simultaneously, it will motivate enterprises to reduce carbon emissions and the government to positively regulate.