Understanding Catastrophe Insurance as a Commons?

ABSTRACT This paper suggests that catastrophe insurance schemes should be considered within the framework of public goods and commons, and as a form of polycentric organization whose success depends on collective action. The first section situates catastrophe insurance within the “state withdrawal hypothesis:” while neoliberalism is usually understood as promoting a shift from social and solidary insurance programs to private, market‐oriented ones, this does not apply to catastrophe insurance. The second section shows that one of the reasons for the persistence of public intervention in catastrophe insurance is its public good dimension: market best practice would indeed promote risk‐based premiums leading to unaffordability issues and the disappearance of the good. Such insurance gaps are perceived as a “public bad.” Catastrophe insurance is thus a hybrid public good: it benefits from a large number of users and is threatened by their exclusion. The final section highlights the polycentricity of insurance systems and the challenge this poses to collective action for the sake of prevention.