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Exploring the Value of Information Sharing in Mitigating Supply Chain Disruptions: Impact of Channel Encroachment

斯塔克伯格竞赛 供应链 频道(广播) 信息共享 业务 激励 产业组织 微观经济学 订单(交换) 博弈论 价值(数学) 竞赛(生物学) 供求关系 信号游戏 渠道协调 分布(数学) 信息不对称 供应链管理 夏普里值 序贯博弈 信息的价值 供应链风险管理 反向感应 经济 环境经济学
作者
Xide Zhu,Cen Guan,Yuwei Li,Haiyang Cui
出处
期刊:Managerial and Decision Economics [Wiley]
卷期号:47 (5): 1179-1200
标识
DOI:10.1002/mde.70090
摘要

ABSTRACT Globalization has significantly amplified the risk of supply chain disruptions, posing serious threats to operational stability. While e‐commerce platforms facilitate information sharing among supply chain members, the precise strategic value of such sharing under disruption risk remains insufficiently explored, particularly across different distribution channels. This research examines a two‐tier supply chain comprising a manufacturer with potential supply disruptions and an e‐commerce platform. The interaction is modeled using a Stackelberg game framework under two distinct sales configurations: without and with manufacturer encroachment. The analysis reveals that the value of information sharing is highly sensitive to several factors, including the sales channel structure, the pattern of demand fluctuations, the manufacturer's efficiency in improving resilience, the intensity of channel competition, and the platform's revenue‐sharing rate. Under the wholesale model, the platform prefers (not) to share negative (positive) demand information. In contrast, under the hybrid model, the platform's sharing strategy becomes complex, which is jointly moderated by multiple parameters. Notably, under disruption‐induced capacity constraints, a higher ex‐ante capacity commitment to the wholesale channel paradoxically reduces realized order volumes, as the manufacturer raises wholesale prices to compensate for reduced allocation flexibility. The manufacturer's encroachment decision is fundamentally a trade‐off between fixed entry costs and anticipated incremental gains. Both elevated revenue‐sharing rates and intensified channel competition are found to suppress the manufacturer's incentive to encroach. Finally, extensions considering endogenous allocation and a signaling game framework demonstrate that the manufacturer's ability to infer demand signals enhances wholesale profitability, thereby further mitigating the motivation for channel encroachment.
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