无人机
计算机科学
认证(法律)
基站
软件部署
身份验证协议
协议(科学)
计算机网络
计算机安全
方案(数学)
地面站
领域(数学)
工程类
纯数学
替代医学
生物
航空航天工程
病理
数学分析
操作系统
医学
遗传学
数学
卫星
作者
Tejasvi Alladi,Vishnu Venkatesh,Vinay Chamola,Nitin Dutt Chaturvedi
标识
DOI:10.1109/infocomwkshps51825.2021.9484594
摘要
Drones, also called Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are attracting significant attention in the research community for their many military and civil uses. They are especially being deployed for assistance in 5G communication networks. As a particular technology starts to gain widespread applicability, it is crucial that it becomes resistant to malicious entities. In particular, the communication between UAVs and the 5G-base station needs to be secured without leaking sensitive information to any unauthorized entities. The constraints on UAV in terms of computation time, impose the condition that any authentication protocol required for authenticating the UAV with the 5G base station must be lightweight in order to be feasible for deployment. To address this issue, a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-based mutual authentication scheme is proposed in this paper. Security analysis of the proposed protocol and a computation time comparison with state-of-the-art authentication protocol in the same field are also presented.
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