Searching for the Best Yardstick: Cost of Quality Improvements in the U.S. Hospital Industry

尺度 激励 投资(军事) 反事实思维 业务 质量管理 采购 精算学 质量(理念) 付款 激励计划 经济 财务 营销 微观经济学 哲学 几何学 数学 认识论 政治 政治学 法学 服务(商务)
作者
Jong Myeong Lim,Ken Moon,Sergei Savin
出处
期刊:Management Science [Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
卷期号:70 (6): 3769-3788 被引量:4
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4875
摘要

The Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program is Medicare’s implementation of yardstick incentives applied to hospitals in the United States. Under the VBP Program, 2% of all Medicare payments to hospitals, estimated to be U.S. $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2021, are withheld and redistributed based on their relative performance in the quality of delivered care. We develop a dynamic mean-field equilibrium model in which hospitals are engaged in repeated competition under yardstick incentives. Using structural estimation methods, we recover key parameters that govern hospitals’ decisions to invest in quality improvement, including the financial and nonfinancial costs and uncertain outcomes of investment. By dynamically solving for hospitals’ individually optimal investment policies, we estimate the trajectory of quality improvements for each hospital, including its investment decisions and quality levels throughout the implementation of the VBP Program. Our counterfactual analyses explore the benefits, on the one hand, of modifying the overall size of the yardstick incentives and on the other hand, of implementing a more focused program tailored to hospital type. We find that increasing the size of the incentives from 2% to 4% would have resulted in an additional quality investment of U.S. $1.2 billion from 2011 to 2018, leading to a 3.3% reduction in the average rate of central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs). Applying yardstick incentives to the tailored hospital peer groups, even without changing the size of the incentives, can lead to an average reduction of 1.4% in the rate of CLABSI among groups of hospitals associated with the highest costs of quality investment. This paper was accepted by Stefan Scholtes, healthcare management. Funding: K. Moon acknowledges support from the Wharton School [Claude Marion Endowed Faculty Scholar Award]. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4875 .
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