期刊:Oxford University Press eBooks [Oxford University Press] 日期:2020-10-22卷期号:: 109-130
标识
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190913656.003.0007
摘要
This chapter explores the existentialist dimension of the self. It shows how existentialist thinkers insist on the irreducible nature of subjectivity while also considering critically the nature of the self. While Kierkegaard affirms an inward self, Heidegger and the phenomenologically inspired existentialists describe the self as always outside itself, extended in its interactions with the world. While Sartre may vigorously defend the self’s intrinsic autonomy, other existentialists, including Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, and Beauvoir, paint a more ambiguous picture of freedom. This chapter shows that despite these divergences, existentialist thinkers tend to agree on a few core ideas concerning the self, including its nature as activity, as relational, as a process of becoming, and as the basis for choice or commitment.