事实上
权力下放
自治
自由裁量权
公共行政
公司治理
政府(语言学)
空格(标点符号)
公共关系
福利
测量数据收集
业务
钥匙(锁)
政治学
社会学
地方政府
中央集权政府
善治
变化(天文学)
官僚主义
光学(聚焦)
公共政策
语言变化
控制(管理)
新公共管理
经济
作者
Dan Honig,Eleanor Florence Woodhouse
出处
期刊:Governance
[Wiley]
日期:2026-06-02
卷期号:39 (3): e70136-
被引量:1
摘要
Drawing on interviews and survey data from street‐level bureaucrats (SLBs) in eight Thai districts, we examine how mission motivation and autonomy combine to shape key SLB behaviors: policy compliance, policy customization, self‐directed action, and pro‐social rule‐breaking. We focus on how SLBs navigate the tension between delivering “up” to Bangkok and delivering “down” to citizens when they perceive these demands to be in conflict. We find substantial variation in how bureaucrats respond to this dilemma, which is potentially mediated by their professional environment (peer and leader interactions) and individual traits (such as rebelliousness and creativity). Leveraging Thailand's unusual combination of high mission motivation and de facto decentralized discretion within a formally centralized system, we show how autonomy can create the space for bureaucrats to prioritize local welfare over strict compliance. In doing so, we highlight the psychological and organizational mechanisms that link mission motivation to SLB behavior and illuminate how de facto decentralization shapes the public administration citizens experience.
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