机会主义
资产专用性
交易成本
信息不对称
微观经济学
业务
资产(计算机安全)
产业组织
不完全合同
经济
计算机科学
计算机安全
市场经济
激励
作者
Fabrice Lumineau,Jason Lu Jin,Shibin Sheng,Kevin Zheng Zhou
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.05.011
摘要
Despite the prominent role of asset specificity in buyer–supplier exchanges, its influence on opportunism remains controversial. While transaction cost economics (TCE) addresses its potential to encourage opportunism, relational exchange theory (RET) highlights its role in discouraging opportunism. We extend this debate by considering (1) the effects of asset specificity asymmetry, (2) changes in supplier opportunism over time, and (3) the moderating roles of supply market uncertainty and prior exchange history. We argue that the logics of TCE and RET are not fundamentally irreconcilable; instead, we suggest a perspective combining the calculative logic of TCE within the relationship logic of RET such that they jointly affect opportunism changes. Our propositions are supported by the results of a matched sample of 193 buyer–supplier relationships at two time points.
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