审计
业务
会计
贷款
联合审计
相似性(几何)
人事变更率
内部审计
精算学
财务
经济
计算机科学
图像(数学)
管理
人工智能
作者
Matthew J. Beck,Nathan G. Lundstrom,Sarah B. Stuber
标识
DOI:10.1111/1911-3846.12930
摘要
Abstract We examine whether peer audit choices influence a bank's decision to obtain an audit voluntarily. We find that the likelihood of a bank voluntarily obtaining an audit is significantly associated with the audit decisions of peers. The relation is stronger when the peers are more salient due to closer geographic proximity, similarity in loan portfolio, or similarity in size. In addition, we find that peer influence on a bank's audit decision is moderated by the bank's existing level of assurance. Specifically, banks already obtaining a lower level of assurance are less likely to begin an audit in response to peer influence. We also find no evidence that peer influence extends to banks’ decisions to cease obtaining an audit. Overall, our findings are consistent with peer influence significantly influencing banks’ decisions to begin obtaining an audit. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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