社会规划师
竞赛(生物学)
社会福利
估价(财务)
营销
福利
经济
市场渗透
人口
业务
规划师
支付意愿
战略互补
微观经济学
市场份额
产业组织
社会选择理论
变量(数学)
可变成本
纵向一体化
市场分析
主题(文档)
信息技术
竞争优势
高等教育
双边市场
市场结构
战略选择
成本效益分析
完全竞争
进入壁垒
战略配合
市场细分
在线学习
在线算法
机会成本
作者
Asoo J. Vakharia,Arda Yenipazarli,Vashkar Ghosh,Gulver Karamemis
标识
DOI:10.1177/10591478251412944
摘要
Educational services contribute $315.65 billion to the U.S. GDP, with online education representing the fastest-growing segment. This paper examines how operational and market factors influence universities’ decisions to introduce online degree programs. We study the strategic introduction of such programs in a vertically differentiated market, where universities differ in online program rankings (quality) and compete for a diverse student population with varying willingness to pay for perceived quality. Our analysis focuses on a simultaneous market entry scenario, yielding robust insights that also hold under alternative settings—such as when universities are equally ranked or differ in their variable costs of technology. We also examine two additional contexts: (1) A mixed competition setting in which one university operates independently while the other is guided by a social planner, and (2) an incumbent—entrant setting in which a university considers launching an online program when its competitor has already entered the market. Our findings reveal that symmetric market entry—where both universities introduce online programs—is more likely when technology integration costs exceed a certain threshold and student valuation heterogeneity is significant. In contrast, when these costs fall below the threshold, asymmetric equilibria arise in which only one university introduces an online program. When a social planner regulates tuition at the lower-ranked university, it faces tighter constraints on entering the market. However, when the higher-ranked university is subject to tuition regulation, broader market coverage and improved social welfare outcomes are achieved. Additionally, lower-ranked universities can strategically enter by targeting lower-end segments through moderate technology investments and competitive pricing. Yet, the entry of a higher-ranked rival can exert downward pressure on tuition fees for both institutions, promoting a more accessible educational environment. These insights offer strategic guidance for universities navigating quality-based competition and provide policy implications for balancing competitive dynamics with educational equity through regulatory interventions.
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