供应链
业务
激励
预订
灵活性(工程)
产业组织
利润(经济学)
微观经济学
利润分享
经济
营销
计算机科学
财务
计算机网络
管理
作者
Jianbin Li,Xiaomeng Luo,Qifei Wang,Weihua Zhou
出处
期刊:Omega
[Elsevier BV]
日期:2020-01-09
卷期号:99: 102195-102195
被引量:97
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.omega.2020.102195
摘要
This study considers a supply chain consisting of two independent agents, a manufacturer and a retailer. The demand and the price of the product are both uncertain, whereas capacity cost is high and capacity lead time is long. As a result, the manufacturer may not have the incentive to expand capacity if the retailer does not share the risk with her. This result induces a lower performance of the supply chain. We propose two types of contracts, i.e., capacity reservation contract and quantity flexibility contract, as risk-sharing mechanisms to encourage the manufacturer to expand the capacity and improve the overall performance of the supply chain. We find that when supply chain coordination is not achieved, our contracts can bring more system profit than other contracts with less flexibility. We further show that by setting elaborate parameters, the two contracts can coordinate the supply chain so that the total profit in the decentralized supply chain is the same as that in the centralized system. Furthermore, we compare the two contracts in terms of capacity and profits. We also show that the retailer prefers the quantity flexibility contract under coordination. Our conclusions are robust when the demand and retail price are correlated.
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