免赔额
精算学
资不抵债
逆向选择
业务
道德风险
人事变更率
政府(语言学)
经济
财务
微观经济学
激励
语言学
哲学
管理
作者
Richard C. van Kleef,Wynand P.M.M. van de Ven,René C.J.A. van Vliet
标识
DOI:10.1111/j.1539-6975.2006.00187.x
摘要
Abstract On January 1, 2006 a new mandatory basic health insurance will be introduced in the Netherlands. One aspect of the new scheme is that the insured can choose to have a deductible. This option should increase the individual responsibility and reduce moral hazard. In the new scheme, a risk equalization system is aimed at avoiding preferred risk selection and insolvency of insurance companies with a relatively high‐risk pool. A crucial issue with respect to a voluntary deductible in this type of social health insurance is whether the premium rebate should be community rated or risk rated . The Dutch government has chosen the former, which means that the premium rebate will be independent of health status and risk. Our analysis shows that, in a situation with “accurate” risk equalization, a community‐rated premium rebate could lead to an adverse selection spiral. Over time, this spiral results in none of the insured taking a deductible and thus no reduction in moral hazard.
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