Traffic support or technical support? incentive strategy of social e-commerce platform considering content quality

With the burgeoning growth of social e-commerce, traffic support and technical support have emerged as pivotal incentive mechanisms for increasing the level of content quality. Considering the quality variation in commercial content, this study investigates four incentive approaches, namely traffic support or technical support for high-quality content, and traffic support or technical support for low-quality content, and constructs game-theoretic model to examine the optimal incentive strategies for the platform. Research demonstrates that traffic support outperforms technical support in fostering content ecosystems, as content quality remains consistently higher under such strategies regardless of whether incentives target high-quality or low-quality content. At equilibrium, the platform maintains the same optimal level of support for both high- and low-quality content when providing technical support, whereas it allocates significantly higher traffic support to high-quality content. Furthermore, compared to low-quality content, platforms can stimulate greater product demand and generate higher profits for both creators and the platform by providing either traffic support or technical support for high-quality content. Interestingly, our findings also reveal that the commission rate significantly impacts decision-making for both creators and platforms. At lower commission rates, traffic support generates greater profits for all parties, while technical support emerges as the more profitable option when commission rates surpass a critical threshold. This study innovatively examines the differential effects of traffic support versus technical support on platform content ecosystems from the perspective of content quality variation, while providing theoretical foundations for platforms to optimize incentive strategies and maximize multi-stakeholder profits.