补贴
透明度(行为)
审查
业务
激励
公共经济学
政府(语言学)
盈利能力指数
会计
经济
财务
市场经济
政治学
语言学
哲学
法学
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101480
摘要
Government subsidies allocated by politicians are ultimately funded by taxpayers, who care about how tax money is spent and demand transparency. I argue that subsidized firms, as beneficiaries of government subsidies, have incentives to provide more disclosures to help politicians achieve a reputation for transparency as well as to lower their own costs from public scrutiny. Using a novel dataset that tracks government subsidies, I provide the first large-sample evidence on the relation between government subsidies and firm disclosure. I find that relative to unsubsidized firms, subsidized firms provide more voluntary disclosures of general information about their business activities and profitability, as well as more disclosures of subsidy-goal-related information, such as job creation and capital investment. Further, these associations are stronger for firms operating in or obtaining subsidies from states whose politicians reveal a stronger preference for subsidy transparency, and for firms that are more likely to attract public scrutiny.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI