补贴
斯塔克伯格竞赛
政府(语言学)
业务
充电站
经济
微观经济学
环境经济学
公共经济学
电动汽车
市场经济
功率(物理)
语言学
量子力学
物理
哲学
作者
Lingling Shi,Suresh Sethi,M. Çakanyıldırım
摘要
Environmental and energy independence concerns lead to government subsidies for electric vehicles (EVs). Operational decisions for a government are (i) to incentivize EV ownership by a direct consumer subsidy, a station subsidy that reduces charging inconvenience, or by both subsidies; and (ii) to minimize subsidy expenditure or to maximize EV adoption level. We model the interactions between the government and the charging supplier as a Stackelberg game and study the optimal structure of subsidies by incorporating charging inconvenience. We prove that this inconvenience is decreasing convex in the number of stations. In the expenditure minimization case, the optimal policy depends on the government adoption target and the charging station construction cost. If the adoption target is below a threshold that depends on the construction cost, the government provides pure consumer subsidy or no subsidy; otherwise, a combination of consumer and station subsidies is optimal. As the construction cost increases, the charger builds fewer stations, regardless of the subsidy type. We establish that expenditure minimization and adoption maximization yield the same subsidy policy if the charging inconvenience is linear. In a real‐life case, we find numerically that a station subsidy alone is optimal if the construction cost is not low but the adoption target is low. Besides, a long driving range reduces the need for subsidies significantly if the construction cost is high, whereas a long charging time necessitates high expenditure allocated mostly to a station subsidy.
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