欺骗
残余物
上下界
分歧(语言学)
高斯分布
计算机科学
公制(单位)
力矩(物理)
Kullback-Leibler散度
控制理论(社会学)
干扰
数学优化
数学
算法
控制(管理)
工程类
人工智能
法学
数学分析
哲学
物理
热力学
经典力学
量子力学
语言学
运营管理
政治学
作者
Qirui Zhang,Kun Liu,Dongyu Han,Guangzhen Su,Yuanqing Xia
出处
期刊:IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers]
日期:2023-02-01
卷期号:68 (2): 1069-1076
被引量:17
标识
DOI:10.1109/tac.2022.3146079
摘要
This article investigates the design of stealthy deception attacks with the aim of destroying the estimate performance without knowing the filter gain. The residual used to detect attacks is generated by the parity space approach and the Kullback–Leibler divergence is adopted as the metric of stealthiness. We first give the necessary and sufficient condition for the inexistence of the strictly stealthy attack, which does not change the residual and can lead to unbounded estimate error. When the strictly stealthy attack does not exist, a lower bound of the secondary moment of the estimate error is then derived via the posterior Cramér–Rao bound. The zero-mean Gaussian attack that maximizes this lower bound is obtained by solving a convex optimization problem. The proposed method can also be applied to design stealthy attacks with the aim of destroying the control performance. Finally, a numerical example of longitudinal flight control system is illustrated to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack.
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