市场流动性
成熟度(心理)
债务
经济租金
信用评级
货币经济学
经济
信用风险
激励
流动性风险
负债率
业务
金融体系
财务
微观经济学
发展心理学
心理学
摘要
This paper analyzes debt maturity structure for borrowers with private information about their future credit rating. Borrowers' projects provide them with rents that they cannot assign to lenders. The optimal maturity structure trades off a preference for short maturity due to expecting their credit rating to improve, against liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is the risk that a borrower will lose the nonassignable rents due to excessive liquidation incentives of lenders. Borrowers with high credit ratings prefer short-term debt, and those with somewhat lower ratings prefer long-term debt. Still lower rated borrowers can issue only short-term debt.
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