The “rational” fan? Negotiating transnational cosmopolitanism and nationalism among Hong Kong BTS fans

ABSTRACTIn recent years, fans of the internationally renowned K-pop group, BTS, (affectionately known as “ARMY”), has achieved global renown with their social political engagement, both online and offline, in different locales, epitomizing the best marriage between globalized popular culture as agent of universal humanitarian ideals, and participatory fandom. On the other hand, the K-pop group has caught backlash from mainland Chinese fen (fans), sparking controversy between transnationalized (pop) fandom (which supposedly could allude to a sense of cosmopolitanism) and (local) nationalism. In this paper, I wish to address, through the case of some Hong Kong BTS fan clubs, the subjectivity of some Asian fans and their complex (layers of) affective and tactical negotiation with competing forces, which are intertwined with (their coping with) the local political juncture. Through in-depth interviews with different fan page organizers of BTS fans/ fan clubs, I will critically discuss how they (resort to) performing “rationality” to balance these forces on the one hand, while inadvertently asserting the boundaries in the seamlessly global flows of popular culture (in the increasingly turbulent Asian context).KEYWORDS: BTS ARMYHong Kong BTS fanspop cosmopolitanismrationalityfan nationalismK-pop Notes1 The term first emerged in 2008 on certain Chinese blogs about literature, or generally referred to female fans. The term acquired a new meaning (and resonance) since 2015, when a group of “jingoistic young” mainland Chinese netizens attacked and accused Taiwanese actress Zhou Tsz Yu of “promoting Taiwanese independence” in 2016, or waged attacks on protesters during the 2019 anti-ELAB movement in Hong Kong in 2019.2 “Little Pink, the New Shade of Chinese Cyber-Nationalism” https://www.europeanguanxi.com/post/little-pink-the-new-shade-of-chinese-cyber-nationalism (accessed on 12 July 2022).3 “Anti-ELAB movement” refers to the series of protest action in Hong Kong from June to November 2019, which was sparked off by a murder that was committed in Taiwan by a Hong Kong person, Chan Tung-kai. When the government announced its bid to revise the Extradition Law to allow for cross-border (Hong Kong-Taiwan) extradition of convicted persons, it sparked off waves of massive scale protests by Hong Kongers who believed it was a smokescreen that would allow the Beijing authorities to extradite without trial convicted Hong Kong persons to the mainland. The protests were seen by pro-democracy camps as a violent crackdown by the Hong Kong (and Beijing) authorities using excessive police force. The government also used the movement as rationale to implement the “National Security Law,” which was seen as a curtailment of major freedoms previously enjoyed among Hong Kong people (although the HKSAR government reiterated that Hong Kong people are guaranteed basic freedoms in the Basic Law).4 As explained in one news commentary, “ARMY” signifies the BTS fans’ conviction to “defend the ‘bullets’ of social stigma and malicious criticisms,” as well as “bond with BTS just like an army.” 17 March 2020 HK01. https://www.hk01.com/sns/article/445705 accessed on 8 May 2022.5 K-pop fans deployed their fancams on an app to report “illegal activity protests” run by the Dallas Police Department; fans sent in K-pop videos and memes to prevent police from tracking BLM protestors’ actions through the app and caused it to be temporarily taken down (Reddy Citation2020; Romano Citation2019).6 For example, in Thailand, fans used K-pop lyrics and memes by trending #Dispatch to express frustration towards their government’s handling of COVID-19, and Thai youth used K-pop dance and social media to mobilize and spread information at pro-democracy demonstrations, in Tanakasempipat (Citation2020).7 In 2019, Chile’s government blamed K-pop and other “international media” for domestic anti-government protests (Reddy Citation2020).8 A Thai BTS fan remarked on Twitter, “The use of violence is something I cannot watch and stand idly by, violence has never helped anything. I hope everyone stays safe […] and take care of yourselves” (Chen 2020; quoted in Andini and Akni Citation2021). This could provide a glimpse into how the humanitarian concern (and care) inspired by BTS could be translated into BTS Thai ARMY’s political actions on social media and in public spaces.9 BTSHK https://www.facebook.com/Btshk.10 The fan club issued a statement in 2013 to clarify their role: “Hi everyone, first of all we just want to emphasize that BTSHK is a ‘backup support organization’, not an information site, so will not keep on updating the latest news about BTS etc. […] The foremost duty of BTSHK is to translate and produce Chinese subtitles (etc.). We will also be responsible for the backup activities of all the BTS events held in Hong Kong (such as food, and onstage support). We hope you will support BTSHK. Thanks!” (7 July 2013, accessed on 30 April 2022).11 BTSBPHKFC Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/btsbphkfc.12 In 2020, BTS made an acceptance speech for the General James A. Van Fleet Award, which was given to BTS by The Korea Society to honour the group’s contributions to positive relations between South Korea and the United States commemorating US troops during the Korean War in the 1950s. The speech was attacked by ultranationalist mainland Chinese “fen” online, as “insulting” and “insensitive.” Please refer to https://www.malaymail.com/news/showbiz/2020/10/12/bts-leader-rm-alienates-mainland-chinese-fans-with-insensitive-comments-abo/1911936 (English), and https://www.storm.mg/article/3106706?page=1 (Chinese).13 Explanation of “little pink fans.” After BTS, “little pink fans” also attacked K-pop group Black Pink. https://www.thenewslens.com/article/143332.14 During the “Korea Ban” incident, supporting Chinese netizens waged their support of the ban, citing slogans such as “no idols before country,” which became viralized across Weibo.15 “Sino-Hong Kong tension/ conflict” as a term started to appear in the early 2010s. The post-handover years saw the burgeoning of tourism and trade between Hong Kong and the mainland. As mainland Chinese tourists and day traders flocked to Hong Kong, their behaviour was increasingly frowned upon by local Hong Kong residents. Videos of fights between Hong Kong and mainland Chinese commuters, as well as of their “unscrutable” behaviour went viral on social media. Successive events also reinforced the misunderstanding and tension that gave rise to commentaries on the “Sino-Hong Kong conflict” phenomenon.16 At the point of writing, BTS has not responded to the accusations. After the BTS acceptance speech, BTS has continuously been attacked by the mainland Chinese “little pink/ fen.” BTS has been invited three times to appear at the UN General Assembly. During the Beijing Winter Olympics 2022, BTS also expressed support of the Korean team on their webpage. This drew the “little pink” fans to wage attack on the webpage, accusing BTS of “insulting China again.” These attacks also incited a wave of counter-attack by other BTS fans, sparking off “fan war” on the webpage. https://istyle.ltn.com.tw/article/18431 (accessed on 24 May 2022).17 “Yellow” (and “blue”) has become a colour that symbolizes “pro-democracy,” since the occurrence of the massive pro-democracy protests in 2014 (which is affectionately known as “Umbrella Movement” or “Occupy Movement 2014”). “Yellow” has been widely adopted throughout history and across cultures as a colour that symbolizes “rebellion” but also “hope.” In the 2014 movement, the yellow umbrella symbolized a tool for “passive resistance to the Hong Kong Police, which used pepper spray to disperse the crowd.” The colour yellow became an icon for democracy, in contrast to “blue” that is associated with pro-government, pro-police and pro-Beijing ideals. Please refer to https://medium.com/demagsign/the-colors-of-protest-46289d141e2b (accessed on 12 July 2022).Additional informationNotes on contributorsYuk-ming Lisa LEUNGLisa Leung Yuk-ming is an Associate Professor of Department of Cultural Studies, Lingnan University Hong Kong. She has been researching in the area of minority and migration studies, and has published Understanding South Asian Minorities in Hong Kong (HKU Press, 2014) and Ethnic Minorities, Media and Participation: Creative Belonging in Hong Kong (2021). Before ethnic minorities, she has published extensively in the transnationalization of East Asian popular cultures. Her latest book chapters discusses Asian co-productions (2019), and Hallyu as a case of mediating Asian modernities (2021). She also focused on the role of social media in social movements, having published journal articles such as “Online radio listening as affective publics? (Closeted) participation in the post-Umbrella Movement everyday,” (Cultural Studies, July 2018).