商誉
供应链
产品(数学)
计算机科学
块链
业务
模式(计算机接口)
循环经济
块(置换群论)
构造(python库)
环境经济学
产业组织
营销
经济
计算机安全
计算机网络
数学
操作系统
生物
生态学
财务
几何学
作者
Yun Liu,Deqing Ma,Jinsong Hu
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.eswa.2023.122811
摘要
Promoting the development of the e-platform and circular economy is significant. This study focuses on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) comprising an individual manufacturer and an individual e-platform. We construct a differential game model from the perspective of dynamic changes in product goodwill and study the issue of selection of sales mode for e-platforms when there exists an application of blockchain to solve the recycling problem. The results show that: The decision of an e-platform to build a blockchain in CLSC depends on the trade-off between blockchain implementation costs and effectiveness, which is determined by the product's real recovery rate. The decision to adopt blockchain does not affect the e-platform's selection of the sales mode, compared to the commission rate, which is the main influencing factor. Interestingly, in the region where the platform and the manufacturer agree, there is a counter-intuitive situation where the manufacturer and the e-platform agree on the reseller mode when the commission rate takes a value close to zero. Blockchain can not only enhance the performance of the CLSC backward chain by increasing the amount of reverse recycling but also improve the performance of the CLSC forward chain by increasing brand goodwill by raising the favorability of environmentally conscious consumers. Blockchain can enhance economic, environmental, and social performance (EES) across CLSC when the construction cost is within a certain threshold, achieving Pareto improvement in both reseller and market modes.
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